持续经营审计意见、审计费用与真实盈余管理-《集美大学学报》（哲社版）

文章信息/Info

Title:: Going concern Audit Opinions,Audit Fees and Real Earnings Management

Author(s):: HUANG Jingru; GAO Xiongtian; Finance and Economics College,Jimei University,Xiamen 361021,China

Keywords:: going-concern audit opinion; real earnings management; audit fees

摘要:: 持续经营审计意见的出具会加剧企业的经营困境，从而影响企业盈余管理行为，持续经营审计意见对盈余管理会产生何种影响是持续经营审计意见经济后果研究的重点之一。基于信号传递理论，以沪深A股2013—2021年非金融上市公司为研究对象，实证检验发现：持续经营审计意见的出具能有效抑制管理层的真实盈余管理行为；进一步研究表明，在高审计费用影响下，这一抑制作用得到进一步增强，审计费用在两者关系中发挥调节作用，持续经营审计意见对真实盈余管理的监管作用在非国有企业中更为显著；对处于财务困境的上市公司而言，持续经营审计意见同样降低了真实盈余管理程度。在利用倾向得分匹配法（PSM）对模型设定的内生性问题进行处理后，结论依然成立。

Abstract:: The issuance of going-concern audit opinions will strengthen the business distress of enterprises,thus affecting the earnings management of enterprises.The impact of going-concern audit opinions on earnings management is one of the focuses of the research on the economic consequences of going-concern audit opinions.Based on signal transfer theory,this paper takes as the research object the non-financial listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2021t.The empirical results show that the issuance of going-concern audit opinions can effectively inhibit the real earnings management behavior of the management.Further research shows that the inhibitory effect is further enhanced under the influence of high audit expenses,and audit expenses play a moderating role in the relationship between going-concern audit opinions and real earnings management.The supervision effect of going-concern audit opinions on real earnings management is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.For listed companies in financial distress,going-concern audit opinions also reduce the degree of real earnings management.Conclusions are still valid when the endogeneity of the model is treated by the propensity score matching method (PSM).