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[1]杨靳,李尧.集装箱班轮市场逆势造船的博弈分析[J].集美大学学报(自然科学版),2012,17(6):428-432.
　YANG JinLI Yao.Analysis on the Shipbuilding Game in a Poor Container Liner Market[J].Journal of Jimei University,2012,17(6):428-432.
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集装箱班轮市场逆势造船的博弈分析(PDF)
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《集美大学学报（自然科学版）》[ISSN:1007-7405/CN:35-1186/N]

卷:
第17卷
期数:
2012年第6期
页码:
428-432
栏目:
航海技术与物流工程
出版日期:
2012-11-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Analysis on the Shipbuilding Game in a Poor Container Liner Market
作者:
杨靳; 李尧
(集美大学航海学院,福建 厦门 361021)
Author(s):
YANG JinLI Yao
(Navigation Institute,Jimei University,Xiamen 361021,China)
关键词:
造船; 博弈; 完美信息静态博弈
Keywords:
shipbuilding; game; static game with perfect information
分类号:
-
DOI:
-
文献标志码:
-
摘要:
        当前集装箱班轮运输市场处于极度萧条之中，集装箱班轮公司却逆势造船.采用完美信息静态博弈模型和完全信息静态模型分析上述经济现象，认为：寡头在追求市场份额时，造船是其占优策略；在短期内市场由萧条进入繁荣的概率必须大于50%以上，寡头才能获得短期利润，其利润期望值才大于零
Abstract:
The container liner shipping market has been gloomy since 2008,but liner operators have been building ships regardless.This article analyses the above economic situation using the static game model with perfect information and static model with complete information. The conclusions are that:shipbuilding is a favourable strategy when oligarchs pursue market shares; however, they can gain short-term profits only if there is higher than 50% probability that the market gloom will become boom in the short term

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更新日期/Last Update: 2014-06-28