高管薪酬外部不公平性与企业风险承担-《集美大学学报》（哲社版）

文章信息/Info

Title:: External Unfairness of Managerial Compensation and Corporate Risk Taking

Author(s):: HU Han-yu; LUO Liang-bin; (College of Finance and Economics, Jimei University, Xiamen 361021, China)

Keywords:: external unfairness of managerial compensation; risk taking; property rights

摘要:: 高管对薪酬公平性的感知影响着公司管理层资本运营和财务经营决策。以2010—2016年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象，考察了高管薪酬外部不公平对企业风险承担的影响。研究发现：高管薪酬外部不公平性会提高企业风险承担水平，且这种效应在国有企业中比在非国有企业中更显著；随着企业发展前景的变差，高管薪酬外部不公平性提高企业风险承担水平的程度更强，且这种作用在国有企业中比在非国有企业中更显著。在控制了内生性等问题后，该结论依然成立。研究表明：优化高管薪酬制度、深化产权制度改革，有利于防范企业风险。

Abstract:: Executives’ perception of pay fairness influences the capital operation and financial management decision. Based on Chinese listed companies’ data from 2010 to 2016, the paper analyzes the influence of external unfairness of managerial compensation on corporate risk taking. It is found that the external unfairness of managerial compensation can increase the level of risktaking, and this effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises. As the prospect of enterprise gets worse, the positive relationship between external unfairness of managerial compensation and risk-taking gets stronger, and this effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises. This paper shows the relationship between external unfairness of managerial compensation and the decision-making of enterprises in financial management, which is beneficial for the reform of the property right system, the optimization of the executive compensation system and the prevention of enterprise risk.