PPP项目收益原则下的剩余索取权安排-《集美大学学报》（哲社版）

文章信息/Info

Title:: A Study on the Allocation of Residual Claim Rights Based on the PPP Surplus Distribution Principle

Author(s):: HUANG Yi-feng; HUANG Shu-meng; (Research Center for Local Financial Performance,Jimei University,Xiamen 361021,China)

Keywords:: PPP mode; consultation game model; allocation of residual claim rights; PPP surplus distribution principle

摘要:: 利用PPP项目三阶段博弈协商模型，考察长期关系型契约对控制权配置的影响，在存在自利性投资情况下，PPP项目能否实现合作剩余有赖于剩余索取权的有效安排。在PPP项目收益原则下，部分剩余索取权会虚置，与剩余索取权的配置原则产生矛盾。我国PPP项目普遍设置最高收益，可能扭曲剩余索取权的分配机制，导致PPP项目三阶段博弈协商模型无法完全实现，剩余控制权和索取权不能达到最优配置。通过引入公共产品消费者参与剩余索取权的分配，既可以实现PPP模式的公共性目标，又可以解决部分索取权虚置问题。PPP项目收益控制和价格调节与剩余索取权有效配置相结合的机制，可以在一定程度上实现剩余索取权有效配置与公共利益最大化。

Abstract:: Using the three-stage game negotiation model of PPP project,this paper studies the influence of long-term relational contract on the allocation of control rights.In the case of self-interest investment,whether PPP project can achieve cooperative surplus depends on the effective arrangement of residual claim rights.Under the principle of PPP project income,partial residual claim rights will be hollow,which conflicts with the allocation principle of residual claim rights.China’s PPP projects generally set the highest income items,which may distort the distribution mechanism of residual claims,making the three-stage game negotiation model of PPP projects unable to be fully realized,and the residual control rights and claim rights unable to achieve the optimal allocation.By introducing consumers of public goods to participate in the distribution of residual claim rights,we can not only achieve the publicity goal of PPP model,but also solve the problem of partial hollow claim rights.The mechanism of PPP project income control and price adjustment,combined with the effective allocation of residual claim rights,can achieve the effective allocation of residual claim rights and the maximization of public interest to a certain extent.