管理防御、内部控制与企业风险承担-《集美大学学报》（哲社版）

文章信息/Info

Author(s):: ZHU Ai-ping; XIAO Chen-yu; (Finance and Economics College，Jimei university，Xiamen 361021，China)

摘要:: 转型经济环境下，我国经理人市场对经理人约束作用有限，经理人的自利和短视行为造成严重的管理防御现象，影响企业风险承担水平。以2012—2018年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，实证研究管理防御如何影响企业风险承担能力以及内部控制对二者的调节作用。研究发现：经理人的管理防御行为通过降低企业的债务融资水平显著抑制企业风险承担水平，而内部控制能在一定程度上削弱管理防御对风险承担的负面效应；按产权性质分组研究发现，相较于国有企业，管理防御对风险承担的负面效应以及内部控制的调节作用在非国有企业更为显著。

Abstract:: In the context of economic transformation，managers’ self-interest and short-sighted behaviors have caused serious managerial entrenchment phenomena，affecting the level of enterprise risk-taking.Taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen Ashare listed companies from 2012 to 2018 as a research sample，this paper empirically studies how managerial entrenchment defense affects corporate risk-taking ability and the moderating effect of internal control on both.The research found that managerial entrenchment behavior significantly inhibited the level of corporate risktaking by reducing the level of corporate debt financing，and internal control could weaken the negative effect of managerial management defense on risk-taking to a certain extent;the research grouped by the nature of property rights found that compared with state-owned enterprises，the negative effects of corporate and managerial entrenchment on risk-taking and the regulatory role of internal control were more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.